

<https://military.wikireading.ru/hqCidpa2O4> ЗАПИСКИ

КОНТРАРАЗВЕДЧИКА. ВЗГЛЯД ИЗНУТРИ НА ПРОТИВОБОРСТВО КГБ И ЦРУ, И НЕ ТОЛЬКО ...

Excerpt from the book: *NOTES OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER. AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE KGB AND THE CIA, AND NOT ONLY ...* Author: Valentin Grigorievich Klimenko

(ЗАПИСКИ КОНТРАРАЗВЕДЧИКА. ВЗГЛЯД ИЗНУТРИ НА ПРОТИВОБОРСТВО КГБ И ЦРУ, И НЕ ТОЛЬКО ...)

Автор: Клименко Валентин

(ВикиЧтение) WikiRead

The CIA reveals its secrets... CIA veterans about covert operations in the USSR. *Klimenko, Valentin Grigorievich*



Chapter Five The Arrest of Ogorodnik. Capture of Martha Peterson red-handed

The KGB of the USSR about the CIA agent Ogorodnik and the detention of Martha Peterson.

Moscow, 1977

In 1973, in Bogotá (Colombia), CIA officers conducted a subterfuge with a woman to set up a Russian diplomat, a second secretary of the Soviet embassy, Alexander Ogorodnik. Their intimate relationship was thoroughly documented by the Americans. But Ogorodnik's compromise was not required. He was contacted operationally on behalf of the CIA, to which he readily agreed, and was recruited to work as an agent for U.S. intelligence. Ogorodnik was taught to use a camera camouflaged in a fountain pen and how to communicate covertly.

In 1974, Ogorodnik returned to Moscow from his tour of assignment. Here, for two and a half years, the Americans maintained contact with him using dead drops, aided by radio. And he supplied them with information about activities of our Foreign Ministry.

In 1977, the agent was exposed and arrested. During the search of his house, they found espionage equipment - containers with photographic films, contact instructions, and a radio receiver to receive one-way radio transmissions. Based on the materials of this case, Yulian Semenov wrote the book "TASS is Authorized to Announce," and later a film of the same name was made, which is of the artistic and documentary genre.

As is known, during his detention Ogorodnik committed suicide, having managed to take the poison he received from the CIA. In the process of detention and interrogation, he volunteered to personally write a confession and describe his sins. He asked that they give him his own fountain pen, in the cap of which American technicians had hidden an ampoule of poison. Due to its inexperience in carrying out such activities, counterintelligence failed to prevent the suicide of this American agent.

A search of Ogorodnik's apartment revealed CIA instructions and a plan to maintain clandestine communication with the Americans in Moscow. Among the instructions were detailed diagrams with the locations of the places of clandestine operations, and the signal system was stipulated (danger, readiness for a drop or successful removal of the cache, etc.) as well as cipher notebooks for deciphering one-way radio transmissions to the agent. Taking into account this evidence and specific instructions from the CIA on ways to communicate with Ogorodnik, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR decided to exploit the operational materials relating to Ogorodnik and summon the Americans to the scheduled covert action to seize the officer from the embassy CIA station who would be performing the operation.

Both in Yulian Semenov's book and in the film, it is described authentically how by analyzing the available materials, counterintelligence figured out the place to place an agreed-to graphic signal on a "Children" sign. This signal was noted by the Deputy Chief of Station of the CIA in Moscow, a First Secretary of the political section Ulmer, while driving home

from the embassy. Acting in accordance with the instructions of the Americans, the Second Chief Directorate and Seventh Directorate of the KGB of the USSR created posts to carry out measures to apprehend the American intelligence officer while laying down the cached container at Poklonnaya Hill in Victory Park in Moscow.

But the Americans - it is necessary to pay tribute to their professionalism - refused to conduct that covert action, discovering the accumulation of forces and equipment of the Seventh Directorate of the KGB concentrated in the area of the upcoming cache operation. On the long-distance one-way radio line from Frankfurt-am-Main, they reported in a transmission for Ogorodnik that they had spotted surveillance of themselves in Victory Park, so in the interest of the agent's safety they postponed the operation to another date and to different place.

In view of our failure, counterintelligence, in compliance with increased measures of secrecy, did everything necessary to prepare an event elsewhere to capture red-handed any American intelligence officer who conducted the dead drop action for Ogorodnik. **As a result of clandestine 24-hour monitoring it was established that on July 15, 1977, it was not a man, as shown in the film, but a vice-consul of the US Embassy and career employee of the CIA, Martha Peterson, who arrived for the secret operation to contact the agent whom we had exposed. The KGB had no information about her affiliation with US intelligence at that time.**

The American woman who had worked at the US Embassy in Moscow since 1975 had been in the embassy CIA station under deep cover. She was distinguished by exemplary

behavior and outwardly never gave counterintelligence a reason to suspect her of belonging to the CIA. Subsequently, it became known that it was Martha Peterson who since 1975 had carried out dead drop operations to lay caches for Ogorodnik and did it early in the morning or late in the evening.

Peterson was driving around town that day, checking for a long time to see if she was being tracked. Finally, she abandoned the car in Sapunov Passage (now Bolshoy Putinkovsky Lane) near Pushkin Square, using the cover, obviously, that in the evening she went to the Rossiya cinema or the Lenin Komsomol Theater. Changing into different clothes, Peterson spent more than four hours on public transport and on foot (in general, the check took more than four hours) to the Krasnoluzhsky Bridge from the Luznetskaya Embankment and crossed this railway bridge across the Moskva River. On the opposite side of the Moskva River at the end of the Krasnoluzhsky Bridge, Martha Peterson placed a container made of plastic artificial black stone in a cache in the gap of a column near the pedestrian path of the bridge. It contained money intended for Ogorodnik, cassettes for a miniature spy camera, gold jewelry, cipher notebooks, two ampoules with deadly poison and instructions on further methods of communication.

The activities of the CIA officer were monitored and documented with the help of night vision devices from secure posts on both sides of the Moskva River, from the supports of the bridge, and a nearby construction crane. Immediately after the container was put in place, the American woman was detained by the KGB capture team. During her capture, she

behaved extremely aggressively and tried to fight with her feet demonstrating taekwondo techniques, in which she was quite proficient, biting and shouting loudly, thus trying to let the agent know, if he was nearby, that the operation had failed.

During a personal search of Martha Peterson, body equipment was seized for listening to radio conversations on the frequencies of external surveillance, but a miniature radio receiver disguised in her ear could not be found then. During the procedure of official proceedings in the reception of the KGB of the USSR, Martha Peterson defiantly, categorically denied belonging to the American intelligence services and her participation in the secret operation. Later, the American woman declared both to the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Consul, Gross, who had arrived at the reception room, that her detention was a KGB provocation.

Like all CIA officers detained before and after her in Moscow and Leningrad, Martha Peterson was declared persona non grata, and she left our country before the end of her foreign assignment. Later, as we learned, after returning to the CIA headquarters, Martha Peterson for many years lectured to young CIA officers on the topic: "How to behave when caught red-handed."

CIA about Ogorodnik

In the decade following the exposure of CIA agent Oleg Penkovsky, the KGB's aggressive practices in Moscow forced the CIA to cut off active work with agents in the Soviet Union. The headquarters of the CIA imposed serious restrictions on the

recruitment of agents in the USSR. CIA operations officers were not allowed to develop or participate in any activity without Langley's prior approval. Given these limitations, the recruitment of agents outside the Soviet Union became a priority, but such opportunities were so rare that each of them deserved special attention.

In 1973, a Soviet diplomat in Colombia, Ogorodnik, was approached by a stranger in the sauna of the Hilton Hotel who spoke to him in Spanish. The diplomat's conversationalist turned out to be a CIA case officer.

This was preceded by the following events. Colombian intelligence services intercepted and taped a phone call from Madrid to the Soviet embassy in Bogotá. A Spanish woman informed a man who answered from the embassy in poor Spanish with a strong Russian accent that she was pregnant. The man assured her that he would take care of her and the child. He also said he could not speak freely on the phone at the embassy and suggested that she call him at the number of the nearest pay phone to the embassy.

Later, Colombian security agents saw that Alexander Dmitrievich Ogorodnik cautiously approached the phone booth from which the phone was ringing. The content of the conversation confirmed their assumption - Ogorodnik was in an intimate relationship with a Colombian woman who was staying with relatives in Spain.

Shortly after the woman returned home, two counterintelligence officers demanded that she introduce them to Ogorodnik. If she or the Russian refused to cooperate, information about their

relationship would be disclosed, the woman would be humiliated, and Ogorodnik would be recalled to Moscow. The Colombian agreed to cooperate, but Ogorodnik became obsessed. He said he would only deal with the CIA.

Two weeks later, Ogorodnik and a CIA operations officer met at the Hilton. This supposedly chance meeting was actually the next stage of a carefully prepared plan to recruit Ogorodnik.

Ogorodnik was a competent economist and, as a diplomat had access to information of interest to the US Administration about the policies of the USSR leadership towards Latin America countries. According to the CIA, Ogorodnik differed from other Soviet diplomats in career ambitions, the desire for a beautiful life and pleasures, and besides, he had problems. First, the KGB had already attempted to recruit him as an informant, which indicated he was considered loyal by the authorities. Secondly, he was married, but in Bogotá he fell into a "honey trap," having a mistress who became pregnant by him. That is, Ogorodnik found himself in a difficult situation - a failed marriage, a pregnant mistress, the threat of career failure - all this made his recruitment possible.

It was immediately obvious to the CIA officer who established operational contact with Ogorodnik that the Soviet diplomat had a strong motivation and a character suitable for espionage. He did not like the Soviet government and was ready to work against it, but in return he demanded compensation and protection. The CIA was to transfer money for his mistress and child, and in the long run help him escape to the West.

Ogorodnik was given the code name "TRIGON" (triangle), and he was carefully instructed on security measures at home, in the embassy, and on the methods of communication and contacts with Americans in Bogota. But most importantly, before returning to Moscow, he had to undergo an intensive training course to learn to work effectively in the Soviet Union,. This was entrusted to a CIA case officer with an engineering education, George Sachs.

The CIA assumed that although Ogorodnik's training was conducted in Colombia, strict secrecy was necessary because the KGB had a strong position in that country and maintained close relations with local police, government officials, and journalists. In addition, as already mentioned, Ogorodnik stood out in the local diplomatic community for his desire for a Western way of life, and KGB embassy officers monitored him as part of their own activities to recruit him as an informant.

Sachs spoke and wrote fluent Russian, and it took him a month to prepare a plan to communicate with Ogorodnik, and he himself, together with a technical officer, conducted direct training of the agent in Colombia. Since Ogorodnik, unlike Penkovsky, was not an intelligence officer, he had to master clandestine measures and methods of operational work, including the use of caches and dead drops, signaling, instant transmissions, car tosses, and sending letters "on demand." In addition, he needed to study modern special equipment and ways of its application, such as photographing documents, reception of short-wave radio broadcasts, working with one-time pads, master the skills of secret writing, and reading microdots.*

Among the special equipment prepared for the agent was the T-50 super miniature camera created by the CIA Office of Technical Services. The T-50 was six times smaller than the world-famous Minox camera and had a cylindrical shape, which, in combination with its small size, made it possible to use various household items such as fountain pens, watches, lighters and key chains as camouflage. With the maximum length of the photographic film, the camera could make 50 frames.

Back in the 1960s, the CIA didn't have small, reliable cameras for photographing documents. But within a few years there was a technical breakthrough. By 1970, CIA specialists were working on creating an extremely small and quiet camera. The requirements for it were simply fantastic: the camera had to work effectively right inside the KGB building. The need for such a camera became urgent precisely when the CIA recruited Ogorodnik in Colombia in 1973.

Under conditions of strict secrecy, the directorate signed a contract with a manufacturer of precision optics to develop a tiny camera code-named T-100, which had the appearance of a small cylinder that could be hidden in household items like a pen, lighter or key case. The lens consisted of eight microscopic elements of lapped glass, adjusted to each other with the utmost precision to provide clear photographs of standard-sized documents. The film, lens and shutter were placed in a single aluminum case. After each shot, the film was automatically rewound to the next frame, there were up to a hundred frames in total. The manufacture of such cameras resembled the production of expensive watches rather than the usual factory

process: each copy was assembled manually under a large magnifying glass.

After some technical problems with uploading the film, the CIA developed the second-generation T-50 camera, which contained 50 images. Now the agent didn't have to bother with replacing the film — he just used the device and returned it.

In the case of Ogorodnik, the role of the cache was played by a luxurious fountain pen, inside of which the camera was hidden. Ogorodnik was trained to photograph documents by placing his elbows on the table, connecting his palms and pointing the pen down on the document. The optimal distance to the paper was 30 centimeters. The camera was given the name Tropel.]

[”Translator: in original: “Тропей.” See [Tropel Fountain Pen Camera | International Spy Museum](#) :



Tropel Fountain Pen Camera

1972, CIA

The end of this fountain pen holds a marvel of mechanical precision and optical miniaturizations. The TROPEL camera lens is made of tiny, precisely ground glass elements stacked to allow clear photographs of documents.]

But before he could start training Ogorodnik, George Sachs mastered the practical work with this camera himself, spending hours on secret photography in the vicinity of Langley and in local libraries. He carried a fountain pen with a camera in his pocket, chose a book or magazine, sat down at a table facing another person and took secret photographs. Sachs repeatedly changed the position of the elbows on the table, trying to determine the best position for filming in order to feel the optimal distance of 28 centimeters from the lens to the photographed surface of the document.

After photographing several cassettes, George passed them on to the CIA's Office of Technical Services, where the images were displayed and critically evaluated. It was only after such intensive months of training that Sachs gained confidence in his own camera skills, after which he flew to Bogotá, where he checked into the Hilton Hotel under cover. Knowing how important TRIGON was to the CIA's Soviet Division, George minimized all contact with other Americans and deliberately avoided visits to embassies and government officials. To coordinate all actions and relay instructions related to Ogorodnik, the specially-chosen CIA officer held clandestine meetings with Sachs.

George was acutely aware that the previous CIA operations officer had done his job by recruiting Ogorodnik, but now it all depended on the results of the training in camera skills and operational techniques. The training lasted several weeks, took place in snatches that did not disrupt the rhythm of the agent's life, and did not attract the attention of the KGB to him. One day, Ogorodnik made his route to the Bogotá Cultural Center so

that there was time to visit the Hilton Hotel. On another occasion, after negotiating at the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce for Soviet aid to Latin America, he stopped by the hotel before returning to the embassy. These unscheduled meetings took anywhere from 15 minutes to two hours, and George never knew in advance when his apprentice would arrive. Sachs constantly sat in the room and struggled with boredom, waiting for the arrival of the agent who suddenly appeared with the words: "I have 15 minutes" or "I have an hour." After several successful training sessions, the agent left the hotel, taking the fountain pen loaded with film with the words: "Now I can do it."

One day, after one of the lessons, the agent told George: "The embassy has just received a new document of very limited access concerning Soviet policy towards China, and I have to familiarize myself with it." George did not approve of the agent's initiative, since access to the document was very restricted, he (would be) constantly in the cipher department of the embassy, and it could only be obtained by signing a receipt to read it, during which the guards viewed the room through a small peephole in the door.

He told the agent, "Sure, we'd love to get these photocopies, but it's not worth your life. Keep thinking about this operation because this is good practice before your return to Moscow." A few days later, TRIGON reappeared in the doorway of his hotel room with a smile on his face and said, "I think I did it."

After his departure, Sachs used a phone outside the hotel to call the technical operations officer who was in another part of the city and gave him a prearranged code phrase for an urgent meeting. After a while, George left the hotel, hiding the fountain

pen with film footage in his belt wallet. Due to increased taxi robberies, George walked around the city for more than an hour to hand over the fountain pen to the technical officer, who would get on the next plane to Washington.

The message George received from Langley pleasantly surprised him. After processing the photographic film, it turned out that only two frames out of 50 were unreadable. All the important content of the political document was removed. The report also said the information had gone to "the seventh floor in Langley," from where the CIA director personally delivered it to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who rated the document as "the most important intelligence he had ever read since becoming head of the State Department."

At the end of the next stage of training, Ogorodnik unexpectedly asked: "By the way, please get me something for suicide in case I get caught." George reported the agent's request to the CIA resident in Bogotá, who telegraphed it to Langley. The head of the Soviet division and the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations had to consider the agent's request and decide. Their response was, "No way."

When Sachs informed the agent that his request had been rejected and he would not receive a poisonous drug (the so-called L-pill), he replied: "Fine, I will no longer work for you." An angry exchange of telegrams between Langley and the station followed. Center asked if the agent was kidding with the case officer. The station case officer who had previously met with the agent asked George to help compile a detailed report. In the report, they indicated that even before recruitment, Ogorodnik and his handler had spent a lot of time together in

Bogotá. They built a trusting relationship and observed secrecy. Often late at night, while drinking, the agent and case officer would talk about politics, philosophy, and personal views. The case officer-handler was sure that he understood Ogorodnik as a person.

And although Sachs only worked intensively with Ogorodnik for a few weeks, both CIA officers agreed that their response at Langley should be: "Either the agent gets the L-pill or we can't continue the operation." After that, Langley's management gave instructions to make an L-tablet for Ogorodnik and hide it in the case of exactly the same pen as the one in which the camera was located.

In 1975, after completing his assignment to Colombia, TRIGON returned to Moscow. He was assigned to work in the Directorate of International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Translator: also known as the Directorate of Planning for Foreign Policy Issues (UpVM) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR]. This was one of the most important and well-guarded units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each Soviet ambassador had to submit to the Ministry an annual report analyzing the situation in the host country, with an assessment of what the embassy was doing to achieve the goals of communism. Through Ogorodnik, the CIA could see the world exactly as the Soviet leadership saw it.

After several months of inactivity, Ogorodnik removed from the cache new cipher notebooks, an agent communication map, and a T-50 camera. After that, a series of documentary materials revealing the details of Soviet foreign policy was received from the agent. In Moscow, Ogorodnik began photographing

hundreds of Soviet diplomatic cables, including secret dispatches written by the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, who worked in Washington, and Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet representative to the United Nations in New York. Ogorodnik's material was so important that the CIA created a separate system for its distribution.

Diplomatic messages that Ogorodnik photographed were translated and printed verbatim on blue-bordered pages. They became known as "blue-border reports" and were delivered by couriers to the White House, the State Department, and the National Security Council. Henry Kissinger was known to have studied them carefully.

*To ensure the maximum safety of the agent, except for one case, impersonal communication was maintained with him using one-way short-wave radio transmissions and written instructions that he received through dead drops. **The agent also never met with the CIA officer who serviced his hiding places, but if only there had been such a meeting, he would probably have been shocked to learn that she was a young woman dressed in the latest fashions and working in an administrative position at the American Embassy in Moscow.***

CIA on Martha Peterson

Martha Peterson appeared in Moscow in 1975. She was thirty years old; She was an attractive but lonely woman (her husband, a CIA officer, died in Vietnam in 1972). She was chosen personally by the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, Robert Fulton, to work in Moscow, and became the first female CIA case officer in the Moscow station.

In Moscow, she led a busy double life. Five days a week, eight hours a day, she spent regularly at her workplace in the consular section, surrounded by Soviet employees, potential KGB informants, and only at lunch did she have the opportunity to go up to the seventh floor to the station to print reports or to prepare for an operation. During the day, Peterson adhered to the usual schedule of an ordinary embassy employee, and the rest of the time she carried a full load in the CIA - in the morning hours and at night she was engaged in operational work with an agent with whom she never met and who was the most valuable CIA source in Moscow. She was nothing like the officers of the Moscow station, so Martha did not attract the attention of the KGB to herself and she was rarely under external surveillance.

From the moment of recruitment in Colombia, Ogorodnik proved that he was an effective agent, but in the spring of 1976, problems began with him in his activities - the first alarm signal was the violation of the contact schedule between the agent and the CIA station. Ogorodnik, for some unknown reason, did not get in touch in February and March. In April, Martha Peterson was assigned to leave the exchange for Ogorodnik in the agreed-upon place - this was her first operational assignment in Moscow.

A parcel in the form of a crushed cigarette pack, inside of which there was a miniature camera, a roll of film and a message, was to be left behind by a lamppost. Peterson deftly placed the package on the ground, pretending to blow her nose and straighten her boot. Following the plan developed at the station, she walked the streets for about an hour, frozen and anxious,

and then returned to the pole to check if the parcel had been picked up. The package was in place. Ogorodnik didn't come. Peterson picked up the package and went home in anxiety and doubt.

On June 21, when Peterson went on her next assignment, the package contained the most important transmission the CIA had ever prepared for Ogorodnik: the very suicide pill he requested. In the dummy of a thick hollow branch, made by the CIA, there was a beautiful black fountain pen with a capsule of liquid cyanide and another, outwardly the same pen with an embedded miniature T-50 camera.

Peterson took the branch to the park, put it by the lamppost and left. Then Ogorodnik came. He picked up the branch and left in its place something like a crumpled milk bag, which he smeared with mustard plaster to make it look like vomit and so that no one would pick it up. An hour and a half later, Peterson returned to the lantern, saw the package, quickly shoved it into a plastic bag in her purse, and walked to a nearby bus stop.

The next step was to paint a thin red line with lipstick on a pole at the stop. It was a signal to Ogorodnik that the transmission had been received, but out of excitement Peterson pressed too hard, the lipstick broke and left a red spot.

Later, in the same 1976, Ogorodnik suddenly panicked: it seemed to him that he was under suspicion, so he threw away the fountain pen with the cyanide capsule and later asked for a new one. Peterson delivered a new pen to him in the same place. At the right time, Ogorodnik came and took the branch.

In January 1977, Ogorodnik signaled that he was ready to leave the exchange next to a large boulder in the woods on Saturday the 29th at 9 a.m. in the place chosen by the station for the cache. Peterson had not been there before, but she was shown a drawing of the terrain. That morning, Moscow was covered by a snowstorm. Peterson drove out of town, on the way, without meeting a soul, parked the car and slid through the forest on skis. A boulder the size of a car was buried in snow. She hoped to see Ogorodnik's footprints but the snow was untouched. No trace. She searched for the transmission but couldn't find it. She dug and sifted all the snow at the boulder, but there was no transmission.

In February 1977, another branch was left for Ogorodnik, which he did not take.

In April, he put the parcel in a cache on schedule, but after opening it, the technical specialists of the station concluded that the exchange was prepared by someone else. Ogorodnik's photos were usually flawless, but this time they seemed sloppy.

The station realized that problems with Ogorodnik had begun. Eventually, the agent was sent a radio message instructing him to set a standard signal with his car, which had to be parked in a certain place at a certain time. Instead of the traditionally quick reaction of the agent, his car did not appear in the established place.

However, to the second request for an additional signal with red lipstick on the warning road sign "Caution, children", the agent gave an answer - the red mark was on the sign the next day. This signal meant that the agent had to pick up the package from the

cache at the agreed time, and the location of the cache was also indicated.

On July 15, 1977, Martha Peterson left her workplace at the usual time. For the next four hours, she walked, took public transport, walked again, carefully checking for surveillance. The only operational task for her that night was to lay a cache for the agent. In the previous 18 months, she had already performed more than a dozen such operations. She had not previously seen signs that she had been under surveillance.

The covert hiding place was a gap in the opening of one of the arches on the pedestrian path of the Krasnoluzhsky Bridge across the Moskva River. Peterson was carrying in a shopping bag a container made by the CIA Office of Technical Services, which resembled a piece of asphalt. This flat piece of black stone, measuring about 15 x 21 x 10 cm, the halves of which were fastened with screws, was stained with dirt so as to give it the usual dirty look.

Inside was a stack of rubles in small bills, stretched with an elastic band, an additional stock of six cassettes for the T-50 camera, several items of jewelry, a camouflaged fountain pen, new contact schedules, one-time cipher pad notebooks, contact lenses, and personal recommendations to the agent regarding photographic film. Inside was also a sheet of paper— a warning printed in Russian:

"COMRADE! YOU'VE FOUND YOUR WAY INTO SOMEONE ELSE'S SECRET. TAKE THE MONEY AND VALUABLES, THROW THE REST INTO THE RIVER AND FORGET ABOUT ALL THIS. YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED."

If someone accidentally found the package and opened the container, this threatening warning could have motivated the finder to dispose of the find and not report it to the KGB.

Peterson completed her test itinerary at dusk. Confident of the lack of surveillance, at 10:30 p.m. she placed the package containing the materials in a cache, pushing it as deep as possible into the gap. She then walked a few steps to the stairs to get down the bridge. Suddenly, three men approached her and grabbed her hands. A van immediately drove out from under the bridge, and another dozen KGB officers appeared. Sensing that the detention of a woman was a surprise to the KGB, Martha tried to take advantage of this instant confusion and shouted, "Provocation!"

***A short struggle ensued, and Martha, the holder of a taekwondo green belt, kicked a KGB officer painfully in the groin before she was neutralized.** KGB officers took the container from the cache, then searched Peterson and found a special radio scanner for monitoring KGB frequencies attached to her bra with Velcro. The "necklace" around Peterson's neck worked as a transmitting induction antenna for a tiny receiver-headphone inserted into her ear. Assuming the scanner was a communications device, KGB officers tried to speak to it in an attempt to get an answer. During the search, the small receiver in Peterson's ear remained undetected.*

Peterson was then taken to Lubyanka, the headquarters of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, where the interrogation began. Soon, phone calls were made to the American embassy with the unpleasant news about the arrest of an American citizen. The representative of the US State Department, arriving

at Lubyanka and seeing it was Peterson who was detained, was surprised no less than the KGB officers on the bridge at the time of her detention.

At two o'clock in the morning, Martha was released. The next day, the Soviet government declared her persona non grata, and Peterson was expelled from the country. She left Moscow on the first plane, never to return to her Moscow apartment. The CIA later learned that Ogorodnik had been dead at least a month before Peterson's arrest.

The exact circumstances of the agent's death for the CIA remain unclear, but confirmation of his death is in the book "Agent Covername - "TRIGON," published in 2000. The author, retired KGB officer Igor Peretrushin, led the investigation and claimed that Ogorodnik, sitting at a table in his apartment and surrounded by officers, at two o'clock in the morning asked for paper and a pen to write a statement to the KGB chairman. He asked for his fountain pen, which was on the table and which the KGB officer had already inspected. The pen was checked again before being given to the agent.

While working on the statement, Ogorodnik interrupted several times and played with the fountain pen. When there was no one near the table, Ogorodnik was able to quickly pull out an L-tablet from the fountain pen and put it in his mouth. Suddenly, he trembled, leaned back in his chair and began to wheeze. KGB officers rushed to him and tried to open his firmly clenched jaws with a metal ruler to extract the ampoule of poison. Foaming blood began to come out of his mouth, and he never regained consciousness.

Five years after the detention of Martha Peterson, the CIA revealed the real story of Ogorodnik - he was betrayed by the Koecher spy family, Karl and his wife Hana. In 1973, when Ogorodnik became a spy, the CIA hired a man named Karl Koecher to work as an interpreter for the Soviet Union and Eastern European Division. Karl received a degree from Columbia University and was fluent in Russian, French and English. He was a naturalized American citizen who immigrated with his wife Hana to New York city in 1965 to escape religious persecution in his country. Koecher's mother was Jewish.

They portrayed themselves as ardent anti-communists, claiming to have fled to America in search of freedom. Both Karl and Hana underwent routine lie detector tests. No one had the slightest suspicion that the couple were in fact "illegals." Surprisingly, the Koechers did not try to join the bureaucratic circles of the CIA, as one might assume.

According to an investigation by reporter Ronald Kessler, who conducted exclusive interviews with the couple, at least twice a week, 40-year-old Karl and Hana, who was ten years younger than him, swapped spouses for sex with other couples or attended sex parties in the Washington area. The Koechers frequented Sex Clubs in New York City, and Hana later boasted that she had slept with many CIA officers, a U.S. senator, journalists from several leading newspapers, and Pentagon officials.

How Koecher learned Trigon's real name remains unclear. According to one version, Karl found out the true name of the agent after he was assigned to work in the group of translators and analysis of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Division.

His job was to translate received written materials and telephone conversations that were secretly taped by the Directorate. Most of these materials were in Russian and Czech languages. Some were from Ogorodnik. According to another version, Hana heard Ogorodnik's name during intimate rendezvous with one of the CIA employees.

Czech intelligence transmitted messages from its agents to the KGB. Koecher's information about a Soviet diplomat working for the CIA in Colombia served as a pretext for launching an investigation, which ultimately made it possible to identify Ogorodnik.

Karl Koecher was arrested in New York City on November 27, 1984, and charged with espionage. He served less than two years in prison, after which he was exchanged for a Soviet prisoner, dissident Anatoly Sharansky. After being released, Karl and his wife returned to Czechoslovakia.

In the Russian press about Koecher there is the following information: Karel Koecher was born in 1934 in Bratislava. He graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics at Charles University in Prague. In 1965, he was sent to the United States as an illegal intelligence officer of the State Security Service of Czechoslovakia. In 1969, he graduated from Columbia University in New York and received his Ph.D. degree. His supervisor was Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski (later Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs). For more than a decade he worked in the analytical department of the CIA. In November 1984, he was arrested on charges of espionage. In February 1986, he was exchanged in Berlin for Soviet dissident Anatoly Sharansky.

And here is what in June 2008 the former employee of Czechoslovak intelligence Karl Koecher himself told the correspondents of the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" about Ogorodnik, the prototype of the American spy from the film "TASS Is Authorized To Announce ...", and about other episodes of the battles of the intelligence services during the Cold War.

Mr. Koecher, were you an agent of the KGB or Czechoslovak intelligence?

I never worked with the KGB directly but was subordinate to Prague. My reports from the United States were received in Czechoslovakia, translated, and sent to Moscow. This was considered cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. In general, Czechoslovak intelligence, in my opinion, was one of the best. In the USSR, they understood this: if a spy was needed in the West, they used Czechs or Germans, not Russians. The Czech, unlike the Russian, quickly adapts, will not stand out and will not attract attention to himself.

How did you even get into intelligence?

I went to intelligence to keep from going to jail. As a young man, I interacted with dissidents, and I was followed by agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I was fired from the radio station where I worked. At some point, I realized that in order to escape from the special services, you need to start working for another part of them – intelligence. Because I would never work inside the country – tell on friends and acquaintances.

And you were taken right away?

Yes. I took a training course in Prague, and then, under the guise of an emigrant, I left for Austria, from where I was supposed to move to the United States.

What was your mission?

Infiltrate the CIA. I knew that to break into the U.S., you have to prove yourself. And that's what happened. I graduated from Columbia University, and my professor, the famous Zbigniew Brzezinski, said, "Koecher is one of my best students." After university, I was approached by "personnel officers" from the CIA. I successfully passed all the checks and ended up in this institution.

Apartment from Andropov

Intelligence didn't pay me any money at all. I went to America with empty pockets so that everything was believable, and then I was paid only for expenses - an air ticket, if, for example, I had a meeting in Vienna with one of my Prague handlers, a per diem. I wrote a letter to Prague: I asked them to buy me a small apartment in New York, where my wife and I could invite the right guests and fish out information from them while socializing. In Prague, they were outraged, they called me arrogant, but my proposal was still transferred to Moscow. The KGB chief Yuri Andropov liked it very much, and he personally demanded they allocate me 40 thousand dollars for an apartment. But Prague only gave half since they were mad at me.

TASS Announced a lie

Now in the Czech Republic I am under a real persecution. I dream of teaching, but they don't let me work. I even think about emigration; I would gladly go to Russia. The main accusation being made against me is that the death of Alexandr Ogorodnik, the CIA agent in Moscow, is on my conscience. But it was different.

Alexander Ogorodnik - the prototype of the American agent "Trianon" from the film "TASS is Authorized to Announce ..."?

Yes. I'll tell you how it really was. This is very different from Julian Semenov's book and from the film. I worked in the analytical department of the CIA with dossiers on diplomatic workers from socialist countries who were in the states of the "third world". They were "sifted" for recruitment. Because today he is a diplomat in Africa or Latin America, and tomorrow he will make a career and occupy high posts. The CIA paid great attention to the Soviet Embassy in Colombia. They were especially interested in a second secretary of the embassy, Alexandr Ogorodnik. I was asked to make a psychological portrait of this man. The CIA believed that it was possible to recruit him. Although it seemed to me that Ogorodnik was a person loyal to the Soviet regime. Loving the Western way of life, but still loyal. I knew that; I even listened to his conversations with his mistress. The fact that the CIA wanted to recruit Ogorodnik I reported through Prague to Moscow. And just in case, he asked to be recalled from Colombia. And then this strange thing started...

My message fell into the hands of Oleg Kalugin, the chief of foreign counterintelligence of the KGB, who, as it turned out

later, was also associated with the CIA. Ogorodnik was not recalled from Colombia. He quietly finished his work in Bogotá and returned to Moscow, where he was immediately appointed to an important position in the Foreign Ministry. Which was generally unheard of because it was known that the CIA was interested in him.

As it turned out, Kalugin himself recruited Ogorodnik as a KGB agent and moved him up the ranks. He reported this to the Americans, and then, at the suggestion of Kalugin, recruited Ogorodnik to the CIA. They gave him spy equipment, and he worked for them for three years.

Ogorodnik was arrested anyway, and as shown in the film, he allegedly swallowed poison that was hidden in a fountain pen. But I have an expert's evaluation from doctors about the causes of Ogorodnik's death. All his life he suffered from heart disease. He was killed by the stress of his arrest. A normal heart attack, not poison.

"Kalugin gave me up"

Kalugin personally, despite Andropov's ban, came to Prague to compromise me. When he met with me, he asked questions that I couldn't physically remember the answers to. I have a good memory, I will remember the whole page of text verbatim, but I will remember it for several hours, not years. And Kalugin accused me of being a traitor, really working for the CIA and not believing me. Moreover, he asked his Czechoslovak colleagues to take a photo of us with him, which was forbidden. And I later presented this photo to the CIA as proof that I worked for Soviet intelligence.

And how did you end up in Prague at the meeting with Kalugin?

While working in the United States, I went to Czechoslovakia illegally three times. Allegedly, I was visiting my wife's relatives in Vienna. There, imperceptibly, right at the station, I was replaced by a double, dressed the same with the same suitcase. This was in case of surveillance, and I got into the car, received a fake passport and drove to Prague ...

And Kalugin managed to compromise you?

Yes, Prague believed him. I went back to the U.S. but my job was frozen. However, Kalugin still handed me over to the Americans, and I was arrested by the FBI.

Exchange on the bridge

In prison, I served time with the real cream of the American mafia, I'm not embellishing that. I even became friends with the leader of the New York motorcycle gangs. And then, through a "spy exchange," I returned to my homeland.

Why did the USSR exchange you and not Czechoslovakia?

For Czechoslovakia I was a bird too high for flight, they didn't know what to do with me after my return. But Kryuchkov, the Chief of Soviet intelligence, immediately agreed to exchange me for a prominent Soviet dissident, Nathan Sharansky. He said, "People like Koecher are worth three Sharanskys." I really appreciated and respected Kryuchkov, we even corresponded later.

Do you remember the exchange itself?

In Berlin, on the bridge. By the way, on the way to Germany, I was treated disgustingly. Kept all the time in handcuffs, in damp cells. And Sharansky was waiting for the swap in a good Berlin hotel.

Milton Bearden on Ogorodnik

Alexander Ogorodnik, a young and promising assistant to the Soviet ambassador to Colombia, began an affair with a Spanish lady living in Bogotá. Thanks to the eavesdropping equipment installed in the Soviet embassy, the CIA was able to control conversations between Ogorodnik, who was married, and his Spanish mistress. The CIA resident in Bogota made operational contact with the Spanish lady and she agreed to help the CIA recruit Ogorodnik. She even showed the CIA a secret diary he had left her for safekeeping and his "will" in which he expressed his hatred of the Soviet system. The Spanish lady agreed to help the CIA in the hope that if her lover became a CIA spy he would stay with her. But the CIA had other plans.

Ogorodnik accepted the CIA's offer and soon began to give the Americans documents or photograph that came by diplomatic mail from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. At the prompting of the CIA, Ogorodnik, who now had the pseudonym "Trigon", agreed at the end of his embassy assignment to be transferred to the Operations Center (Office for Advanced Planning of Foreign Policy Events) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Bogotá, he received special training in the use of caches to communicate with the CIA station in Moscow.

Before leaving Bogota, Ogorodnik demanded a meeting with a CIA officer who would keep in touch with him in Moscow. It turned out to be Jack Downing, who was preparing to go to Moscow as deputy CIA station chief. In the summer of 1974, he flew to Bogota specifically to calm Ogorodnik. Both were about the same age, and good contact was soon established between them.

Ogorodnik admitted to Downing that he wanted to get a poison capsule from the CIA in case of arrest, and even stated that if he was not treated "humanely" and was not given a capsule, he would not return to Moscow. The CIA reluctantly agreed, and Ogorodnik returned home. On his return to Moscow, he divorced his wife, but never saw his Spanish mistress again.

Between 1974 and 1977, Ogorodnik was one of the CIA's most valuable agents in Moscow. He gained access to most of the Foreign Ministry's encrypted correspondence and began to hand over Top Secret documents to the Americans that gave them an unprecedented opportunity to know in advance the Soviet position on strategic arms negotiations in the 70s.

But the KGB remembered Ogorodnik mainly in connection with what happened after his arrest. Specific details are still unclear, but it is known that he took his Mont Blanc fountain pen, which Downing handed over to him in Bogota, and took the poison capsule hidden in it. Ogorodnik managed to bring the fountain pen to his mouth and bite the capsule with potassium cyanide. Covering his mouth with his hands, he had to take three quick breaths, as Downing instructed him to do. Before the stunned KGB workers could do anything, Trigon was dead. The Second

Chief Directorate was in a state close to panic, and for many it almost cost their careers.

Since then, a new procedure for making arrests has been established.

From the author

The "Ogorodnik case" and the red-handed capture of CIA officer Martha Peterson during a secret operation in 1977 caused an extraordinary wakeup within the KGB. The previous counterintelligence operation in 1975 to expose "initiators" (*initsiativniki*) Grigoryan and Kapoyan and to capture them red-handed when a container for them was tossed out of a car by CIA officer Edmund Kelly passed without wide press coverage, and, I would say, more privately, whereas the "Ogorodnik Case" received wide publicity. Those traitors to the motherland did not have important information such as was accessible to Ogorodnik, and did not cause serious damage to their country, as they were neutralized in timely fashion by Soviet counterintelligence.

The Ogorodnik Case was indeed the KGB's most significant effort to expose CIA agents after the Popov and Penkovsky cases. The beneficiary of the victory over the Americans was the developer and unmasker of Ogorodnik - the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, headed by Major General Vyacheslav Ervandovich Kevorkov. To a lesser extent, the victory was also celebrated by the First (American) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, which was commanded at that time by Colonel Yevgeny Mikhailovich Rasshchepov. The event was supervised by the

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate KGB USSR, Major-General Vitaly Konstantinovich Boyarov, who was directly involved in it.

Officers of the Seventh Department glowed with pride and joy that they had managed to expose a US intelligence agent from among the officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the target of their operational service, and the department managed at a fairly early stage to block the channel of leakage of important, state-important information from the institution under their jurisdiction, thereby clearly fulfilling the functional duties assigned to it by the leadership of the KGB of the USSR. The mood was overshadowed only by the death of Ogorodnik, who took poison in the process of recording his detention.

As for the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD/VSU), which within the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was responsible for the American line in general and for the CIA embassy station, although the department took an active part in monitoring American intelligence officers in the city and in preparing the operation to detain the CIA intelligence officer, we were not able to identify Martha Peterson in a timely manner as an employee of the embassy station responsible for impersonal communication with Ogorodnik.

The operational development dossier for Martha Peterson, as I recall, was led by operative Boris Pisarev, and when, after the detention of the American woman, the leadership of the department requested her file for familiarization, it turned out that instead of a voluminous volume with

documents there was only a thin folder, in whose materials there was not a hint of her belonging to the CIA.

The Americans beat us cleanly, arranging covert operations with Ogorodnik using a female CIA officer, which was a complete surprise for us at that time. There was no intelligence at *Glavka* [Translator: HQ 2nd Chief Directorate] about Peterson's affiliation with US intelligence, and she led a lifestyle in the embassy that did not allow the KGB to suspect her of involvement in the agent activities of the CIA embassy station.

And, in my opinion, in the interpretation of the CIA's work with Ogorodnik in Colombia, and in the description of Martha Peterson's stay in the US Embassy and her operations with Ogorodnik, exactly the most interesting details loom that are missing in my presentation in my first book " *Notes of a Counterintelligence Officer*¹."

Interesting are the characterization of Ogorodnik that the Americans give him, the description of the process of his training to operate the camera, and recommendations for photographing documents inside the Soviet Embassy in Bogota. The CIA confirmed that audio monitoring equipment had been introduced into the Soviet Embassy in Colombia. Such admissions about technical penetration into the buildings of diplomatic missions by intelligence services are extremely rare. The Americans specifically named the operatives who trained Ogorodnik and worked with him, including Jack Downing, who

¹ Book *Notes of a Counterterrorism Officer*, An inside look at the confrontation between the KGB and the CIA, and not only this..." Klimentko Valentin Grigorievich—ISBN 978-5-7133-1611-2 Pub. 2018

(« Книга " « Записки контрразведчика. Взгляд изнутри на противостояние КГБ и ЦРУ, и не только..."
Клименко Валентин Григорьевич)

in 1986 became the CIA resident in Moscow and directly participated in the CIA's activities in the *Prologue* case (our *Operation Fantom*).

According to Aldrich Ames, it was he, on the instructions of the head of the Latin American branch of the department of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, Haviland Smith, who led Alexander Ogorodnik in Colombia. Ames, speaking Russian, together with an operative of the CIA station in Bogota, recruited Ogorodnik in the sauna of the Hilton Hotel, organized his operational training, and worked out intelligence tasks with him. At Smith's direction, Rick Ames tried to convince Ogorodnik that he didn't need a pill with a deadly poison (L-pill), but he failed, and the CIA hid the pill for its agent in a lighter.

A few months later, back in Moscow, Ogorodnik made it known that he needed another similar pill, since he had allegedly lost his cigarette lighter. The office sent him another one, disguised in an expensive fountain pen. On this occasion, Aldrich Ames said: "We always believed that Ogorodnik had lost the first poison pill hidden in the lighter we gave him, but after he committed suicide, rumors began to reach us that he had actually used the pill to murder a woman in Moscow. It was his mistress that he wanted to get rid of. Of course, the CIA decided that this was Soviet disinformation, because none of us wanted to admit that we might be responsible for providing him with the weapon to murder an innocent woman."

Operations with Ogorodnik in Moscow were led by CIA Chief of Station Robert Fulton. He, like Gerber later, was my personal target for development.

Fulton served in Korea as a military intelligence officer, became a CIA officer in 1955, and worked in Finland, Denmark, Vietnam, and Thailand. It is known that in Moscow he also took part in impersonal contacts with Ogorodnik, recovering the package he had placed in the park area on Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow.

One day, when Ogorodnik signaled that he was "ready to deliver the parcel," Fulton himself headed for the rendezvous. He calmly put his dog Goliath in the car and moved to a wooded hill overlooking the city near Moscow State University (MSU). As he approached the drop site, Fulton noticed that he was being lazily followed by a KGB surveillance team. But he often walked the dog in this forest, and they did not suspect anything unusual. When Fulton opened the door, the dog suddenly jumped out and rushed into the birch-pine forest. Fulton chased after him. The dog urinated on the tree exactly where Ogorodnik left the package. Fulton quickly grabbed it and shoved it into his jacket pocket, so that the KGB officers did not have time to see what was happening. He took the package home but did not open it, suspecting that the KGB had installed a video camera in his apartment.

I remember that surveillance report that described the situation that Robert Fulton was talking about, but the summary did not indicate any suspicious moments in the behavior of the American.

The next morning, the package was opened at the station. It had ten coils of film and a note. In their interviews, high-ranking CIA veterans claimed that Burton Lee Gerber was the author of the introduction of "deep covers" into the CIA practice as part of

Operation *Clean Gap* (*операция чистая цель*) and allegedly only from 1991-1992 did such CIA officers began to be implanted in the US Embassy in Moscow.

But, in my opinion, Martha Peterson is also a clear example of a "deep cover" officer who led a double life not only for the KGB, but also for American diplomats, for whom her belonging to the CIA was a complete surprise. She was a protégé of Robert Fulton, at that time the CIA's Chief of Station in Moscow, and it was on his recommendation and at his insistence that her mission to the USSR took place So I think Robert Fulton could well share with Burton Lee Gerber the laurels of the pioneers of this very successful operation "Clean Gap" for the CIA.

As for the interview with Karl Koecher, his opinion about the role of former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin in the "Ogorodnik Case" and his compromise of this Czechoslovak illegal intelligence officer is very remarkable. The KGB did have serious suspicions about Kalugin and an official investigation was conducted about the episodes of his participation in events with Ogorodnik and involvement in the exposure of Koecher by the Americans. However, there was no direct clues and serious evidence of Kalugin's guilt in Koecher's failure at that time.

In 1995, Oleg Kalugin left the USSR for the United States. In 2002, in Russia, he was convicted in absentia of high treason and sentenced to 15 years in prison, to be served in a high-security colony. According to the verdict of the Moscow City Court, Kalugin was deprived of his military rank, personal pension and two state awards.

Contents of the book *NOTES OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER. AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE KGB AND THE CIA, AND NOT ONLY*

:

1. [Preface](#)
2. [Chapter One Interview with CIA Officer Milton Bearden](#)
3. [Chapter Two Interview with CIA Officer John Sipher](#)
 4. [The head of the third CIA about the channels of communication with the agents. A bit of history](#)
 5. [Chapter Four The One-Man Theatre](#)

Chapter Five The Arrest of Ogorodnik. Capture of Martha Peterson red-handed

6. [Chapter Six Exposing CIA Agent Polyakov](#)
7. [Chapter Seven "The Sheymov Case"](#)
8. [Chapter Eight The Arrest of Tolkachev. Capture of Paul Stombaugh red-handed](#)
9. [Chapter Nine The Arrest of Vorontsov. Capture of Michael Sellers red-handed](#)
10. [Chapter Ten Interview with CIA Officer Michael Sellers](#)
11. [Chapter Eleven The Arrest and Exposure of CIA Agent Leonid Poleshchuk](#)
12. [Chapter Twelve The Red-Handed Capture of CIA Officer Eric Seitz](#)
13. [Chapter Thirteen CIA Operation Codenamed SC TAW](#)

14. [Chapter Fourteen Interview with CIA Officer Gene Coyle](#)
15. [Chapter Fifteen The CIA Operation, Code-Named Absorb](#)
16. [Chapter Sixteen Espionage in the Twenty-First Century](#)
17. [Chapter Seventeen CIA officer Rolf Mowett-Larsen on contacts with the SVR and the FSB of Russia](#)
18. [Chapter Eighteen Veterans and the Director of the CIA on Interaction with the SVR and the FSB](#)
19. [Afterword](#)
20. [Biography](#)

Klimenko's bio:

https://www.shieldandword.mozohin.ru/personnel/2018/klimenko_v_g.htm

Родился 15 декабря 1944 г. в Москве.

В мае 1963 г. окончил школу, в 1963 – 1966 г. проходил срочную службу в Советской Армии. После демобилизации работал разнорабочим во ВНИИ полиграфической промышленности, затем макетчиком в мастерской №12 «Моспроекта-2», окончил курсы английского языка при Институте иностранных языков им. М.Тореза.

В органах госбезопасности: с 1 августа 1968 г. Учился на [2-м факультете ВКШ КГБ им. Ф.Э.Дзержинского](#), после его окончания в 1973 г. работал в [1-м отделении 1-го отдела 2-го Главного управления](#) КГБ при СМ СССР. Занимал должности:

- Помощник начальника [1-го отдела 2-го Главного управления](#) КГБ СССР – начальник оперативной группы по разработке резидентуры ЦРУ в Москве [1-го отделения](#) (на 1980 – 1983 г.);

- Заместитель начальника 1-го отдела 2-го Главного управления КГБ СССР – начальник 1-го отделения (1983 – 1991 г.);

Born on December 15, 1944, in Moscow.

In May 1963 he graduated from high school. 1963 - 1966 he served in the Soviet Army. After demobilization, he worked as a handyman at the All-Russian Research Institute of the Printing Industry, then as a modeler in workshop No. 12 of Mosproekt-2, graduated from English courses at the M. Torez Institute of Foreign Languages.

In state security organs: from August 1, 1968 he studied at the 2nd faculty of the F.E. Dzerzhinsky VKSH KGB, after his graduation in 1973 he worked in the 1st section of the 1st department of the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He held the following positions:

- Assistant to the Chief of the 1st Department of the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR - Chief of the Operational Group for the Development of the CIA Station in Moscow of the 1st Department (for 1980 - 1983);
- Deputy Chief of the 1st Department of the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR - Chief of the 1st Department (1983 - 1991);

After the collapse of the USSR, he continued to serve in the security organs of the Russian Federation:

- Chief of the 1st Service (American) of the Directorate of Counterintelligence Operations of the Ministry of Security of Russia, then
- 1st Deputy Chief of the Directorate of Counterintelligence Intelligence Operations (UKRO) of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)

- FSB of Russia, since 1997 - Chief of the UKR - Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence *Departament* of the FSB of Russia,
- From November 5, 2000 - Representative of the FSB of Russia in Israel. On 5 November 2004 he returned from his duty assignment.
- On January 29, 2005, he was discharged from active military service upon reaching the age limit.

Rank:

1. Major General (1994);
2. Lieutenant General;

Awards: Order of the Red Star (1986), the Order of the Red Banner of Labor (1990), Order of Military Merit (1999), badges "Honorary State Security Officer" (1981) and "Honored Employee of the Security Bodies of the Russian Federation" (2000), medals, public awards.

Source: V.G. Klimenko, Notes of a Counterintelligence Officer. An Inside Look at the Confrontation between the KGB and the CIA, and not only...

Russian:

После развала СССР продолжил службу в органах безопасности РФ: начальник 1-й Службы (американской) Управления контрразведывательных операций МБ России, затем 1-й заместитель начальника УКРО ФСК – ФСБ России, с 1997 г. – начальник УКРО – заместитель начальника Департамента контрразведки ФСБ России, с 5 ноября 2000 г. – представитель ФСБ России в Израиле. 5 ноября 2004 г. вернулся из командировки. 29 января 2005 г. уволен с действительной военной службы по достижении предельного возраста.

Звания:

- Генерал-майор (1994 г.);
- Генерал-лейтенант;

Награды: ордена красной Звезды (1986 г.), Трудового Красного Знамени (1990 г.), «За военные заслуги» (1999 г.), нагрудные знаки «Почетный сотрудник госбезопасности» (1981 г.) и «Заслуженный сотрудник органов безопасности Российской Федерации» (2000 г.), медали, общественные награды.

Источник: В.Г.Клименко, Записки контрразведчика. Взгляд изнутри на противостояние КГБ и ЦРУ, и не только...

<https://imobook.ru/book/seriya-sekretnye-missii/zapiski-kontrrazvedchika-vzglyad-iznutri>

Lieutenant General Valentin Grigoryevich Klimenko, was born December 15, 1944 in Moscow, lives in Moscow, is married and has two children.

After graduating from eleven years at Moscow secondary school No. 175, serving in the Army from 1963 to 1966 and two years of work at Mosproekt-2, in August 1968 he entered the F.E. Dzerzhinsky Higher Red Banner School of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in a 2nd (counterintelligence) specialty [faculty].

In January 1973 he graduated with a gold medal in the specialty "Jurisprudence", with the assignment of the military rank of lieutenant and the qualification "lawyer with knowledge of a foreign language."

From 1973 to 1991, he was an operations officer in the First (American) Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, then headed the First (American) Service of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and from 1997 to 2000, in the rank of Lieutenant General, he was Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence *Departament** of the FSB of Russia - Chief of the Directorate of Counterintelligence Operations (UKRO FSB RF).

In 1997, he studied at advanced training courses at the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation under the program “Public Service of the Russian Federation: Organizational and Legal Framework and Staffing”.

From 2000 to 2004, in the diplomatic rank of adviser, he worked at the Russian Embassy in the State of Israel (Tel Aviv) as an official representative of the FSB of the Russian Federation.

On January 29, 2005, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 105, upon reaching the age limit (60 years), he was retired from active military service.

He was awarded the Orders of the Red Star (1986), the Red Banner of Labor (1990), "For Military Merit" (1999), Andropov (2012), 18 medals of the USSR and the Russian Federation, various certificates and many other departmental awards.

Honorary titles were awarded: "Honorary State Security Officer" (1981) and "Honored Security Officer of the Russian Federation" (2000).

- [* Translator: *Departament* was used for a short period; equivalent to Directorate]

- Publisher: International Relations
- Release year: 2022
- Series: Secret missions
- ISBN: 978-5-7133-1611-2
- Cover type: hardcover 145 x 215 mm
- Number of pages: 256
- Item Code:: 0873
- Availability:: In Stock

Bestseller | bestseller

-

The confrontation between the KGB and the CIA during the Cold War has always been in the public eye, but it was most clearly manifested in the 1980s of the twentieth century, called by historians *the decade of espionage*.

The author tells in detail about the "exploits" of the CIA at that time on the territory of our country, the ways and methods the Americans recruited our compatriots, and the tactics the CIA organized clandestine contacts with its agents. In chronological order, it reveals most of the (successful and not so successful) operations of the KGB against American intelligence services in the 1970-1990s of the past century.

A special place in the author's narrative is occupied by the operational game "Phantom" - a unique counterintelligence operation conducted by the KGB, according to experts from the CIA, at a high professional level and based on which the filmmakers shot eight serial television films "Where the Motherland Begins".

For the first time, the reader is also presented with the inner world of a counterintelligence unit specializing in work against American intelligence diplomats, and specific employees are named who laid the foundation for modern methods of developing employees of the CIA embassy station in Moscow.

[Link to the article about this book from the newspaper: "Arguments and Facts" - At any cost to break away from the "outside". How were spies caught in the 1980s?](#)

Russian:

Теги: [Книги по разведке](#), [История](#)

- Издательство: Международные Отношения
- Год выпуска: 2022
- Серия: Секретные миссии
- ISBN: 978-5-7133-1611-2
- Тип обложки: твердый переплет 145 x 215 мм
- Количество страниц: 256
- Код Товара:: 0873
- Наличие:: В наличии

Записки контрразведчика. Взгляд изнутри на
противоборство КГБ и ЦРУ, и не только... Книга первая

• [Клименко В.Г. \(Klimenko V. \)](#)

- [Аннотация](#)
- [Полистать фрагмент книги](#)
- [Об авторе](#)

Противоборство КГБ и ЦРУ времен холодной войны всегда было в центре внимания общественности, но наиболее ярко оно проявилось в 1980-е годы XX столетия, названные историками десятилетием шпионажа.

Автор достаточно подробно рассказывает о «подвигах» ЦРУ в тот период времени на территории нашей страны, способах и методах вербовки американцами наших соотечественников, тактике организации ЦРУ конспиративных контактов со своими агентами. В хронологической последовательности раскрывает большинство (удачных и не очень) операций КГБ против американских спецслужб в 1970–1990-е годы ушедшего века.

Особое место в повествовании автора занимает оперативная игра «Фантом» – уникальная контрразведывательная операция, проведенная КГБ, по мнению специалистов из ЦРУ, на высоком профессиональном уровне и по мотивам которой кинематографистами снят восьми серийный телевизионный фильм «С чего начинается Родина».

Впервые перед читателем предстает и внутренний мир контрразведывательного подразделения, специализировавшегося в работе по американским дипломатам-разведчикам, и называются конкретные сотрудники, заложившие основу современных методов разработки сотрудников посольской резидентуры ЦРУ в Москве.

[Ссылка на статью об этой книге из газеты: "Аргументы и Факты" - Любой ценой оторваться от «наружки». Как ловили шпионов в 1980-е?](#)



Теги: [Книги по разведке](#), [История](#)

- Издательство: Международные Отношения
- Год выпуска: 2022
- Серия: Секретные миссии
- ISBN: 978-5-7133-1611-2
- Тип обложки: твердый переплет 145 x 215 мм

- Количество страниц: 256
- Код Товара:: 0873
- Наличие:: В наличии

Бестселлер | Bestseller